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A. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case concerns the denial of an application for a variance from certain 
setback requirements for two decks which had been built within the setback area 
without first having obtained a variance or a building permit from Appellant Kootenai 
County (hereinafter referred to as "the County.") 
B. Concise Statement of Facts 
Respondents James and Penny Wohrle (hereinafter referred to as "Wohrle") 
constructed two decks on real property they own near Wolf Point on Coeur d'Alene 
Lake prior to September of 2005 without first having obtained either a variance or 
building permits from the County. (A.R. 1 at 41, 112, 175.) The smaller deck is thirteen 
feet by eighteen feet (13'x18') in size and is built upon a concrete reinforced area of the 
hillside, above the ordinary high water mark of Coeur d'Alene Lake (elevation 2128' 
Avista datum, per the decision of this Court in In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 
147 P.3d 75 (2006)). (A.R. at 40, 112, 175.) The larger deck is built into the hillside 
with three pilings located below the high water mark, and was originally twenty-six feet 
by fourteen feet (26' x 14') in size. (A.R. at 40, 112, 175.) Later, at the request of the 
1 References to the agency record prepared by the County in this matter (Case No. V-841-05) for the 
Petition for Judicial Review in the District Court will use the abbreviation "A.R." (See R. at 155.) 
References to the clerk's record prepared for this appeal will use the standard abbreviation "R." 
References to the transcript of the hearings held before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner and the 
Board of Commissioners will use the abbreviation "Board Tr." (See id.) This is the transcript originally 
prepared for the District Court proceeding, which was filed on September 7, 2006. References to the 
transcript of the hearings held before the District Court will use the abbreviation "Dist. Ct. Tr." 
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Idaho Department of Lands (IDL), Wohrle reduced the size of this deck to 
approximately twenty-six feet by six feet (26 'x 6'). (Board Tr. at 24-25.) 
The site is a 1.377-acre parcel which is accessible by boat only. (A.R. at 35-41, 
104.) The parcel is a steep, north facing slope sparsely vegetated with trees and 
brush, with the exception of the shoreline, which is mostly rock with some brush and 
moss. (Id.) The property is located in the Restricted Residential zone. (A.R. at 104, 
175.) 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers issued a Notice of Violation on 
June 16, 2005, citing Wohrle for discharging two (2) yards of concrete for pile footings 
and fifty (50) cubic yards of grouted broken rock into Coeur d'Alene Lake without a 
permit pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act. (A.R. at 72-74.) A copy of this 
letter was sent to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department, which 
initiated a code enforcement action, Case No. CV-4080-05. (A.R. at 112, 176.) IDL 
also issued a stop-work order in June of 2005. (A.R. at 125). 
On November 22, 2005, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers sent a letter to 
Wohrle stating that it had determined that the concrete and grouted broken rock which 
were the subject of the Notice of Violation were not causing "discernable adverse 
effects on the aquatic environment." It also warned Wohrle, however, that the "grouted 
broken rock fill and the concrete footings for the pier are not authorized and may not be 
maintained." (A.R. at 75-76.) IDL also issued a letter to Wohrle stating that the portion 
2 
of the main deck structure located below the high water mark was in compliance with 
IDL requirements. (A.R. at 125.) 
C. Course of Proceedings 
Wehrle applied to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Board") on September 16, 2005 for a twenty-five foot (25') variance 
from the twenty-five foot (25') front setback requirement outlined in section 8.09 of the 
Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance then in effect, Ordinance No. 348, as amended 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Zoning Ordinance"). (A.R. at 41-44, 175.) This 
requested variance would have allowed for a front setback of zero (0) feet at the 
front/north property line for the two existing decks. (A.R. at 43-44, 175.) The 
application was deemed accepted by the Kootenai County Building and Planning 
Department as of October 21, 2005. (A.R. at 105.) 
Wohrle's variance request was assigned Case No. V-841-05, and was heard by 
Kootenai County hearing examiner Gary Young on March 16, 2006. {A.R. at 43-44, 
159, 169-70; Board Tr. at2-14.) On March 21, 2006, Young issued a recommendation 
that this request be denied. (A.R. at 159-63.) Wohrle requested a public hearing 
before the Board in a letter dated March 27, 2006, and at a public meeting for 
deliberations on pending planning and zoning cases held on March 30, 2006, the 
Board granted that request. {A.R. at 24, 60, 193; Board Tr. at 17-19.) 
On June 1, 2006, the Board held a public hearing on the application and on 
similar variance applications submitted by two (2) neighboring property owners, Ted 
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and Johanna Baycroft, and Jerry Judd. (A.R. at 174, 189-91; Board Tr. at 22-41.) 
Debbie Wilson of the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department introduced 
the case, and James Wehrle testified and responded to questions from the Board. Ted 
Baycroft, who was one of the neighbor-applicants, testified in favor of Wohrle's 
application. The Board also received comment sheets. (A.R. at 189; Board Tr. at 23-
31.) The Board then closed the public hearing in this case and moved on to one of the 
other public hearings. (A.R. at 190; Board Tr. at 31-32.) 
During the course of proceedings in all three cases, Wilson provided the Board 
with documentation from the Kootenai County Assessor's Office regarding the 
valuation of the property. (Board Tr. at 32-36.) Soon thereafter, the Board reopened 
the public hearing in this case to afford Wehrle an opportunity to examine that 
documentation and to offer a response. (A.R. at 190; Board Tr. at 36-37.) James 
Wehrle did offer comments in response to this information. (A.R. at 190; Board Tr. at 
37-39.) The Board then closed the public hearing on this request, and deliberated on 
all three requests. (A.R. at 190; Board Tr. at 39-40.) At the conclusion of 
deliberations, the Board voted to deny Wohrle's variance request. (A.R. at 178, 190; 
Board Tr. at 40-41.) On June 15, 2006, the Board voted to approve signature of the 
order denying Wohrle's variance request, and signed that order. (A.R. at 174-78, 186; 
Board Tr. at 44-45.) 
On July 13, 2006, Wohrle timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review and Writ of 
Mandate in the District Court, which was assigned to the Honorable John T. Mitchell. 
4 
(R. at 1-6.) Wohrle filed a Motion to Augment Record on October 12, 2006. (R. at 9-
10.) The motion was accompanied by an affidavit with exhibits containing the materials 
which were the subject of the motion. (R. at 11-42.) The motion was heard on 
November 29, 2006. (R. at 86; Dist. Ct. Tr. at 3-16.) The District Court granted the 
motion, though it questioned the relevance of the materials submitted. (R. at 86; Dist. 
Ct. Tr. at 15-16.) A written Order Granting Motion to Augment Record was entered on 
December 5, 2006. (R. at 86-87.) 
The District Court heard oral argument on the Petition for Judicial Review on 
February 20, 2007. (Dist. Ct. Tr. at.17-55.) After hearing argument from counsel, the 
Court made findings and ruled on the matter from the bench. (Dist. Ct. Tr. at 49-51.) A 
written Order on Petition for Judicial Review was entered on February 26, 2007. (R. at 
112-13.) Pursuant to the Court's instructions, the parties subsequently filed briefing 
regarding costs and attorney fees. (R. at 114-39; Dist. Ct. Tr. at 52-54.) The Court 
entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Attorney Fees in this case and in 
its companion case, Judd v. Kootenai County, Kootenai County Civil Case No. CV-06-
5322, on March 27, 2007. (R. at 140-49.) The County filed a Notice of Appeal on April 
6, 2007. (R. at 150-54.) 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in ordering that the record be augmented 
to include information pertaining to a variance request which was not at issue in the 
petition for judicial review before it. 
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2. Whether the District Court erred in holding that the decision of the 
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in Case No. V-841-05 was arbitrary, 
capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
3. Whether the District Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of 
the Board. 
4. Whether the District Court erred in ordering that the requested variance 
be granted, subject only to a determination by the Board on remand as to the extent of 
the variance to be granted. 
5.. Whether the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Wehrle on 
the basis that the decision of the Board was without a basis in fact or law. 
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a decision of a local governing board pursuant to the 
Local Land Use Planning Act, Title 67, Chapter 65, Idaho Code (LLUPA), on appeal 
from a decision of the District Court on a petition for judicial review of the local entity's 
decision, has been very recently set forth by this Court as follows: 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to 
seek judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as 
provided for in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act (IDAPA). For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA 
decisions, a local agency making land use decisions, such as the Board, 
is treated as a government agency under IDAPA. 
In an appeal from district court, where the court was acting in its appellate 
capacity under IDAPA, the Supreme Court reviews the agency record 
independently of the district court's decision. Id. As to the weight of the 
evidence on questions of fact, this Court will not substitute its judgment 
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for that of the zoning agency. Id. The Court defers to the agency's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and the agency's factual 
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even when there is 
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are 
supported by evidence in the record. Planning and zoning decisions are 
entitled to a strong presumption of validity, including the agency's 
application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. 
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds 
that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in 
excess of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the 
statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) 
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The party attacking the 
agency's action must first illustrate that it erred in the manner specified 
therein and must then show that a substantial right of the party has been 
prejudiced. Id. 
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 2007 WL 4531786, at *2-*3 (2007 
Opinion No. 140, Dec. 27, 2007) (citations omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court erred in ordering that the record be augmented to 
include information pertaining to a variance request which was not at 
issue in the petition for judicial review before it. 
Rule 84({) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs the District Court's 
ability to approve or deny a request for augmentation of the record before it on a 
petition for judicial review. It reads as follows: 
Any party desiring to augment the transcript or record with additional 
materials presented to the agency may move the district court within 
twenty-one (21) days of the filing of the settled transcript and record in 
the same manner and pursuant to the same procedure for augmentation 
of the record in appeals to the Supreme Court. Where statute provides 
for the district court itself to take additional evidence, the party desiring to 
present additional evidence must move the court to do so within twenty-
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one (21) days of the filing of the transcript and record with the district 
court. Where statute provides for the district court to remand the matter 
for the agency to take further evidence before the district court renders its 
decisions on judicial review, the district court may remand the matter to 
the agency. 
I.R.C.P. 84({). 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for augmentation of the record on appeal 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Crown Point Development, Inc. v. 
City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 75-76, 156 P.3d 573, 576-77 (2007). A decision 
within the discretion of the district court will not be disturbed on appeal if the court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of 
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. at 76, 
156 P.3d at 577. 
With respect to decisions made under LLUPA, the appropriate legal standard is 
found in Idaho Code § 67-5276, which determines whether the district court may take 
additional evidence itself, or whether a remand to the appropriate entity is necessary. 
It reads as follows: 
(1) If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for 
leave to present additional evidence and it is shown to the satisfaction of 
the court that the additional evidence is material, relates to the validity of 
the agency action, and that: 
(a) there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding 
before the agency, the court may remand the matter to the agency with 
directions that the agency receive additional evidence and conduct 
additional factfinding. 
8 
(b) there were alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, 
the court may take proof on the matter. 
(2) The agency may modify its action by reason of the additional evidence 
and shall file any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the 
reviewing court. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5276. 
Here, as in Crown Point, the District Court correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. However, it failed to 
act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable 
legal standards. 
First, the District Court erred in finding that the materials proffered by Wohrle 
were material to a review of the decision made by the Board in this case. The issue 
before the Board was whether to grant Wohrle's request for a variance from a setback 
requirement set forth in the Zoning Ordinance. Idaho Code § 67-6516 states in part 
that "(a] variance ... may be granted to an applicant only upon a showing of undue 
hardship because of characteristics of the site and that the variance is not in conflict 
with the public interest." A variance request focuses upon a specific parcel of property. 
City of Burley v. Mccaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 909, 693 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Ct. 
App. 1984). It is, by definition, "limited to adjustment of certain regulations concerning 
the physical characteristics of the subject property." Gay v. Bonneville County, 103 
Idaho 626, 628, 651 P.2d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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According to the above-cited authority, the decision of whether to grant or deny 
a variance is to be made based on unique characteristics of the parcel for which the 
variance is requested where compliance with the land use regulation at issue would 
constitute an undue hardship. Therefore, any attempt to introduce evidence regarding 
a variance request which was granted is not material, nor would it relate to the validity 
of the Board's action in this case. 
In addition, these materials were never presented to the Board when the Board 
heard this matter, and Wohrle failed to demonstrate that there were good reasons for 
failure to present them at that hearing. Even if that were the case, the District Court 
erred by failing to remand the matter to the Board with directions that it receive 
additional evidence and conduct additional fact finding after consideration of those 
materials. 
Finally, the District Court erred in granting this motion because the proffered 
materials did not constitute evidence of alleged irregularities in procedure before the 
Board. Instead, as the District Court recognized, these materials were offered to show 
that the Board's decision in this case was arbitrary and capricious. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 15, 
L. 5 through p. 16, L. 9.) Thus, it was offered in support of Wohrle's allegation that the 
Board committed a substantive error in reaching its decision in this case, rather than a 
procedural irregularity. Daley v. Blaine County, 108 Idaho 614, 617 n.2, 701 P.2d 234, 
237 n.2 (1985); cf. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 360-61, 2 P.3d 738, 745-
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46 (2000) (finding that district court erred by augmenting record with substantive 
evidence outside agency record but holding that error was harmless). 
For these reasons, the District Court abused its discretion in granting Wohrle's 
motion to augment the record to include materials pertaining to another case in which 
the Board granted a variance. This alone is reason enough for this Court to vacate the 
decision of the District Court. 
B. The District Court erred in holding that the decision of the Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners in Case No. V-841-05 was arbitrary, 
capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
1. The decision of the Board was not arbitrary and capricious. 
The District Court found that the Board's decision in that case was arbitrary, 
capricious, and an abuse of the Board's discretion. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 50, L. 22-25.) For 
the reasons stated below, the Court erred in making this determination. 
A variance from the requirements of a county land use ordinance is defined in 
Idaho Code§ 67-6516. This reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
A variance is a modification of the bulk and placement requirements of 
the ordinance as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front yard, side 
yard, rear yard, setbacks, parking space, height of buildings, or other 
ordinance provision affecting the size or shape of a structure or the 
placement of the structure upon lots, or the size of lots. A variance shall 
not be considered a right or special privilege, but may be granted to an 
applicant only upon a showing of undue hardship because of 
characteristics of the site and that the variance is not in conflict with the 
public interest. 
Idaho Code § 67-6516 (emphasis added). As stated above, a variance request 
focuses upon a specific parcel of property, and is limited to the adjustment of certain 
11 
regulations concerning the physical characteristics of that property. City of Burley, 107 
Idaho at 909, 693 P.2d at 1111; Gay, 103 Idaho at 628, 651 P.2d at 562. 
The approval or denial of a variance is within the discretion of the body with 
authority to make decisions under county land-use planning ordinances, including 
boards of county commissioners. Idaho Code §§ 67-6516, 67-6519; Sanders Orchard 
v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002). This discretion is not 
unbounded, however. Sanders Orchard, 137 Idaho at 698, 52 P.3d at 843. For a 
variance to be granted, the applicant must show that he or she has suffered an undue 
hardship due to the characteristics of the site, and must additionally show that the 
variance would not conflict with the public interest. See Idaho Code§ 67-6516. 
Applications for variances are also governed under the Zoning Ordinance, the 
relevant portions of which are cited in Section 4.01 of the Board's decision in Case No. 
V-841-05. (A.R. at 176-77.) In order for a variance application to be approved, the 
following findings must be made: 
a) Whether the requirements of Section 30.03 [regarding notice of 
public hearing and the holding of that hearing] have been met. 
b) Whether the reasons set forth in the application justify the granting 
of a variance. 
c) That the variance is the minimum that will make possible the 
reasonable use of the land, building or structure. 
d) That the granting of the variance will be in harmony with the 
general purpose and intent of the Zoning Ordinance, and will not 
be injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the 
public welfare. 
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Zoning Ordinance § 30.03 (subsequently codified at Kootenai County Code § 9-23-3). 
There is a strong presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, 
which includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances. 
Sanders Orchard, 137 Idaho at 698, 52 P.3d at 843. · 
The District Court found that the decision of the Board was not supported by 
evidence in the record, and thus was arbitrary and capricious. The Court based this 
decision on its finding that there was no evidence in the record which supported the 
Board's finding that Wohrle failed to establish that the granting of a variance would not 
be in conflict with the public interest. (R. at 49-51.) Because the decision of the Board 
was supported by substantial, and in fact undisputed, evidence in the record, the 
District Court erred in making this determination. 
The structures at issue were built within a twenty-five foot (25') setback 
applicable to properties within the Restricted Residential zone without first obtaining a 
variance. Zoning Ordinance§ 8.09 (subsequently codified at K.C.C. § 9-8-10). (See 
A.R. at 40-41, 112, 175.) This is a prerequisite to the issuance of building permits for 
construction of structures within a setback. Thus, these structures were also built 
without the required building permits. See Zoning Ordinance § 28.02 (subsequently 
codified at K.C.C. § 9-22-2); K.C.C. § 7-1-7. 
It was only after Wohrle received a Notice of Violation from the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, and the code enforcement action which ensued from that violation was 
initiated, that they came to the County asking for forgiveness. Particularly telling in this 
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regard is James Wohrle's comment at the public hearing before Hearing Examiner 
Gary Young that "[w]e just thought we were under the radar for this thing .... " (Board 
Tr. p. 4, L. 13-14.) 
Therefore, to grant a variance to Wohrle by the Board under these 
circumstances, or worse, to require the Board to grant a variance to Wohrle, as did the 
District Court, would be to grant "a right or special privilege" specifically prohibited by 
Idaho Code § 67-6516. Such a variance is also clearly in conflict with the public 
interest, as the Board specifically found in Sections 5.01 and 5.02 of its order, as 
follows: 
The issuance of variances that not only encroach into the required 
setback but also the lakebed is not in the public interest and would allow 
a benefit that is not afforded to other property owners fronting Coeur 
d'Alene Lake .... 
The granting of the variance requested in this application does not meet 
the requirements of Idaho Code §67-6516 because it would serve to 
legitimize [Wohrle's] construction of decks without required building 
permits, which would be considered a special privilege .... 
[T]he requested variance is not necessary to accommodate the 
recreational use of the property and would be detrimental to surrounding 
properties and the public welfare if zero setbacks and lake 
encroachments were to be allowed, even by special permit. 
(A.R. at 178.) Furthermore, these findings show, at a minimum, that the granting of a 
variance in this case would not be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of 
the Zoning Ordinance, which must certainly include an expectation of compliance with 
its provisions. See Zoning Ordinance§ 30.03 (K.C.C. § 9-23-3). 
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In addition, Wohrle offered no evidence to the Board that the variance request 
was the minimum setback variance necessary to make possible the reasonable use of 
the property, as the District Court recognized. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 51, L. 4-24.) This is 
especially true of the requested "zero setback" (actually a "negative" setback to the 
extent the structures cantilever over the lake). The only stated reason for the 
requested setback variance was to legalize the structures actually built. Had Wohrle 
contacted the County before building these structures, instead of relying on the 
representations of others, Wohrle could have designed a site plan which provided for 
no encroachment into the setback (in which case a variance would have been 
unnecessary), or at least requested a variance for a lesser encroachment than the 
structures which were actually built. 
Wohrle's attempt to excuse their conduct as not being in bad faith, and that they 
were simply misinformed, does not rise to the level of justifying the granting of a 
variance, either. Ignorance of the law is no excuse, and neither is reliance on the 
representation of persons with no connection to the County. It is the duty of the 
property owner to ascertain what regulations may pertain to a contemplated building 
project before the owner commences it. 
Based on the above discussion and the record as a whole, the decision of the 
Board in Case No. V-841-05 was supported by substantial and was neither arbitrary 
nor capricious. Moreover, it was well within the Board's authority, and within the sound 
discretion vested in the Board by the statutes and ordinances which grant that 
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authority, to deny the requested variance for failure to show that it would not conflict 
with the public interest based on the undisputed evidence in the record. Therefore, the 
decision of the District Court in this case should be vacated, and the decision of the 
Board should be affirmed. 
2. No substantial rights were prejudiced as a result of the Board's decision. 
As Justice Stephen Bistline once pointed out, "there is no entitlement to a ... 
variance, even where an applicant has met all of the required conditions. The granting 
of such a variance is discretionary with the Board of Commissioners, and the fact that 
an applicant has jumped through all the right hoops does not necessarily guarantee 
that the Board will decide in the applicant's favor." South Fork Coalition v. Bonneville 
County, 117 Idaho 857, 868, 792 P.2d 882, 893 (1990) (Bistline, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original). 
The denial of Wohrle's variance request does not deprive Wohr!e of any lawful 
use of their property prior to their variance application; it merely reinforces the pre-
existing limitations on the use of this property. Moreover, even without the requested 
variance, Wohrle is still able to put their property to use as permitted under applicable 
state laws and regulations, and county ordinances. Specifically, ownership of this 
property entitles Wohrle to use and enjoy a dock on Lake Coeur d'Alene, so long as it 
is in compliance with the requirements of the Idaho Department of Lands and, when 
applicable, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. This is a reasonable use of this 
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property which accrues to only a relatively few number of parcels located in Kootenai 
County. 
Because Wohrle is not entitled to the granting of a variance, and because 
Wohrle is able to put the property to reasonable use with or without the variance, no 
substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result of the decision in this case. 
Accordingly, that decision should be affirmed. 
C. The District Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the Board. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279 begins by very clearly stating that when a court is 
considering a petition for judicial review, "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 
67-5279(1). Instead, the court must instead defer to the Board's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Sanders Orchard, 137 Idaho at 697-98, 52 P.3d at 842-43. 
It is very apparent from the record, however, that the District Court did just that 
in determining that the decision of the Board was arbitrary and capricious. During the 
District Court's ruling from the bench, the Court stated the following: 
The argument was made today that as far as the public interest 
component that I have to decide, quote, people must comply with county 
ordinances including zoning and building ordinances, and then alter on, 
not getting the proper permit is relevant, but it's not determinative as to 
the public interest. With all due respect, I disagree with that. I don't think 
that is a component. ... 
What is at issue is whether it was an undue hardship given the terrain to 
seek a variance, and then whether the variance would be in conflict with 
the public interest. All the relevant parties have weighed in. Neighbors, 
Department of Lands, the Corps. They're just - I don't think there's any 
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indication in the record, period, that the variance wasn't in conflict with 
the public interest. 
(Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 50, L. 4-20.) This shows that the District Court engaged in 
impermissible fact finding in rendering its decision in this case. 
Even more glaring, however, were the following statements in the District 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Attorney Fees, entered on March 
27, 2007. First of all, the Court again engages in impermissible fact finding by stating 
that "there was ample evidence in the record to show that the petitioners [Wohrle] had 
met the two requirements of LC.§ 67-6516 .... " (R. at 146.) The Court then went on to 
state that "the reason the Court remands this case back to the Board of County 
Commissioners is to have the commissioners do what they should have done the first 
time." (R. at 147; emphasis added.) 
Finally, the Court stated that it had held "that there was a due process violation 
when the Board deviated from the record .... " (R. at 148.) This statement is untrue for 
two reasons. First, while the Court did discuss whether a due process violation 
occurred, it stopped short of making that specific finding. (See Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 49, L. 12-
18.) Secondly, the Board could not have deviated from the record, since it reopened 
the public hearing to receive additional testimony and evidence regarding information 
obtained from the Kootenai County Assessor's Office at the Board's request. (See 
Board Tr. p. 32 L. 12 through p. 39 L. 17.) 
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The statements of the District Court quoted above show that it erred by 
determining the relevance of evidence, weighing evidence, and making factual findings 
in making its decision, rather than deferring to the factual findings of the proper finder 
of fact, which in this case is the Board. Therefore, the Court should vacate the 
decision of the District Court and affirm the decision of the Board. 
D. The District Court erred in ordering that the requested variance be 
granted, subject only to a determination by the Board on remand as to the 
extent of the variance to be granted. 
In its decision given at the February 20, 2007 hearing, the District Court 
remanded the case to the Board for the limited purpose of determining the appropriate 
scope of the variance to be granted. As discussed above, the District Court erred in 
doing so because this constituted an impermissible substitution of the Court's judgment 
for that of the Board. Additionally, it violated the statutory mandate that "[i]f the agency 
action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further 
proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3). 
In Daley I>'. Bia/Re Cot1nty, 10!l klat'lo 614, 701 P.2d 234 (1985), the district court 
reversed a decision denying a request for a conditional use permit and for a setback 
variance, finding that the decision of the Blaine County Board of Commissioners was 
"arbitrary and capricious and clearly erroneous." Daley, 108 Idaho at 616, 701 P.2d at 
236. The district court's order of judgment ordered Blaine County to grant the 
requested conditional use permit and setback variance. Id. This Court reversed that 
decision. Id. In doing so, this Court made the following observation: 
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The district court's review of the board of county commissioners' decision 
was pursuant to I.C. § 67-5215. Under I.C. § 67-5215, the district court 
was acting only in an appellate capacity. District courts acting in this 
capacity are not authorized to interfere with the substantive 
decisionmaking process .... To sanction such interference in the ordinary 
case would undermine the important role local agencies play in the land 
use planning process and possibly negate meaningful participation by the 
public in the decisionmaking process. 
Id. at 617-18, 701 P.2d at 237-38 (quotations omitted). 
Here, the District Court effectively ordered the Board to grant a variance to 
Wohrle when it expressly limited the issue for the Board's consideration on remand to 
the scope of the variance to be granted. (Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 51 L. 19-24.) Because this is 
a violation of Idaho Code § 67-5279, as interpreted in Daley, the District Court erred in 
so limiting the scope of the issues to be considered by the board on remand. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate this aspect of the District Court's decision. 
E. The District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Wohrle on the basis 
that the decision of the Board was without a basis in fact or law. 
If this Court vacates the decision of the District Court on any of the grounds set 
forth above, it would also be appropriate for this Court to vacate the District Court's 
award of costs and attorney fees to Wohrle, as Wohrle would no longer be considere·d 
the prevailing party. Crown Point, 144 Idaho at 78, 156 P.3d at 579. In addition, this 
Court should vacate the District Court's award of attorney fees to Wohrle because the 
decision of the Board had a reasonable basis in fact or law, thereby precluding an 
award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
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Idaho Code§ 12-117 governs the awarding of attorney fees in civil actions to 
which a public entity is a party. It reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a 
county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable 
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is 
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
(2) If the prevailing party is awarded a partial judgment and the court 
finds the party against whom partial judgment is rendered acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law, the court shall allow the prevailing party's 
attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses in an amount which reflects 
the person's partial recovery. 
Idaho Code § 12-117(1)-(2). This Court exercises free review of a district court's 
decision to award attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-117. Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 361, 
2 P.3d at 746. 
An award of attorney fees under this statute is inappropriate in any action in 
which the court is asked to interpret a statute for the first time within the context of the 
facts of that case. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Boundary County, 138 Idaho 534, 537, 66 
P.3d 238,241 (2003). An error by a state agency or local governing body in applying a 
legal standard to the evidence in the record does not automatically provide a basis for 
an award of attorney fees. Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 361, 2 P.3d at 746; Cox v. State of 
Idaho ex rel. Dep't of/ns., 121 Idaho 143, 148, 823 P.2d 177, 182 (Ct. App. 1991). If a 
provision of a statute ordinance is ambiguous or unclear, or if the proper interpretation 
of such provision is not a matter of settled law, an award of attorney fees under Idaho 
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Code§ 12-117 is inappropriate, even if a court later finds the decision of the agency or 
governing body to be erroneous. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 2007 WL 
4125461, at *2-*3 (2007 Opinion No. 113, Nov. 21, 2007); Cox, 121 Idaho at 148,823 
P.2d at 182. 
Each of the above principles apply here. This case calls for the application of 
both a statute and a county ordinance which concurrently govern the consideration of 
variance requests. The issue on which the District Court based its decision was 
whether a board of county commissioners could deny a variance request for failure to 
prove that the granting of a variance would not conflict with the public interest, when 
the structures which were the subject of the request were built without the owner first 
having received the necessary permits - which, in this case, included both a variance 
and a building permit. 
The Board believed this was a valid basis for the denial of a variance, but the 
District Court ultimately disagreed. The language of the statute and county ordinance 
considered by the District Court in making its decision undeniably gives governing 
boards wide, though not unbounded, discretion to grant or deny variances to certain 
land use requirements. In addition, there are no Idaho appellate decisions which 
specifically address this issue. Accordingly, the legal standards which the Board 
applied in making its decision did not, on their face, give the degree of clear legal 
direction which the appellate courts of this state have indicated would justify an award 
of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117. See University of Utah Hosp. v. Ada 
22 
County, 143 Idaho 808, 812, 153 P.3d 1154, 1158 (2007); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 
141 Idaho 349, 355-56, 109 P.3d 1091, 1097-98 (2005). 
Therefore, even though the District Court decided that the Board's decision was 
based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable· 1aw, an award of attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-117 would be inappropriate even if this Court were to affirm the 
decision of the District Court because the Board's decision had a reasonable basis in 
fact and existing statutes, case law, and county ordinances, and because this action 
involved the interpretation of very broad statute and county ordinance language in a 
context which has not been definitively addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in ordering that the record be augmented to include 
information pertaining to a variance request which was not or at issue in, nor relevant 
to, the petition for judicial review before it. The Court also erroneously held that the 
decision of the Board was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. In so 
holding, it impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the Board, particularly by 
limiting the scope of remand to a determination of the extent of the variance which the 
Court required the Board to grant. Finally, the District Court erred in awarding costs 
and attorney fees to Wehrle on the basis that the decision .of the Board was without a 
basis in fact or law in a case of first impression in this state. Therefore, this Court 
should vacate the decision of the District Court in Case No. CV-06-5323, and should 
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affirm the decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in Case No. V-841-
05. 
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